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The ʿAmārāt, their Sheikh, and the Colonial State: 





How did the era of colonial divide-and-rule in the Arab East—the creation of the new 
mandates of Great Britain and France—appear to the Bedouin communities who lived 
through it? This article examines this important period of change from the perspective 
of a prominent Bedouin sheikh, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl of the ʿAmārāt (ʿAnaza). Moving 
between the southern and western frontiers of Iraq, the ʿAmārāt have seldom been the 
focus of historical enquiry, but their attempts to navigate the disturbed interwar land-
scape offer a window onto the changing prospects for Bedouin groups across the Arab 
East. Building on a close reading of colonial sources, the article reveals how important 
social, economic, and political dynamics of Bedouin life persisted to shape relations 
within the new mandates, as the ʿAmārāt, their sheikh, and the young colonial state all 
jostled for influence and authority.
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When I had arrived in Iraq the three great Anaiza divisions. . . . had been 
under the leadership of three old men, all of them quite outstanding person-
alities. . . . But the death of Fahad [Ibn Hadhdhāl] and the retirement of Al 
Nouri [al-Shaʿlān] to Damascus left the Ruwalla and the Amarat under the 
leadership of two young, dashing and perhaps slightly jealous young men.1
1    J.B. Glubb, Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service (London: Cassell, 1983): 198-199.
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 Introduction
In the 1920s and 1930s, as British and French officials extended their author-
ity over the arid frontiers of their new Middle Eastern mandates, they often 
bemoaned the quality of Bedouin leadership in modern times. Sheikhs nowa-
days, many complained, were cosseted and avaricious, more distant from their 
tribesmen than their forebears had been. Where once they could be left to their 
own devices, it increasingly fell to government to supervise sheikhs, to rein-
force their authority, and in the last resort, to fill the void.2 Historians are less 
inclined to blame the victim but nonetheless observe a collapse of Bedouin 
political autonomy in the first half of the twentieth century. The interwar years 
in particular are seen as a watershed for Bedouin groups across the Arab East, 
a time when external forces overrode their internal dynamics. The political 
landscape was recast into the League of Nations mandates of Great Britain 
and France, while new international boundaries, the advent of mechanised 
transport, and renewed state proscriptions against intertribal raiding eroded 
the economic and social foundations of long-range nomadic pastoralism. For 
Kurt Franz, in his extensive sketch of two thousand years of Bedouin history, 
the birth of the mandates “rang in the rapid and far-reaching loss of Bedouin 
autonomy,” as the intrinsic dynamics of Bedouin polities were overwhelmed by 
the external logics of colonialism and the international state system.3 Besieged 
on all sides, the zaman al-shuyūkh (age of the sheikhs) passed into memory.4
This article explores how much freedom and agency the Bedouin retained 
in the era of colonial “divide-and-rule.” It does so by tracking the fortunes of a 
particular Bedouin group through those crucial interwar years, attempting to 
see events through their eyes. In one sense, the case for abrupt discontinuity 
has gone by default. International and imperial histories of the Middle East 
2    T. Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003): 83-100.
3    K. Franz, “The Bedouin in History or Bedouin History?” Nomadic Peoples 15 (2011). For schol-
arly collections exploring these phenomena in various parts of the Arab East, see Nomadic 
Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century, ed. D. Chatty (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006); The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East, ed. M. Mundy and 
B. Musallam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Village, Steppe and State: The 
Social Origins of Modern Jordan, ed. E. Rogan and T. Tell (London: British Academic Press, 
1994).
4    For the importance of this concept in modern tribal memory, see T. Schoel, “The Hsana’s 
Revenge: Syrian Tribes and Politics in the Shaykh’s Story.” Nomadic Peoples 15 (2011) and 
A. Shryock, Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority 
in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
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in this period have been predominantly state-centric. Rather than emphasise 
Bedouin actors or choices, they present the central authorities as active agents 
awakening dormant hinterlands and their “marginal” populations. There is 
little place for Bedouin agency in narratives of the progressive rationalisation 
of national space, the spread of “law and order,” or the state’s monopolisation 
of violence.5
And yet, Bedouin groups across the interwar Arab East did not find them-
selves facing fully-sovereign national states—not yet, at least—but colonial 
states, and ones subject to the new form of mandatory rule at that. This fact 
is widely taken for granted; the specific dynamics of colonial rule are less fre-
quently explored. Among historians, there is a growing awareness that we may 
have exaggerated the power of colonial rule, set too much store by its tech-
nological innovations, and overstated the speed and extent of its break with 
the past.6 In practice, European mandatory rule often resulted in a prolifera-
tion of sources of authority, with multiple, overlapping layers of jurisdiction. 
In Iraq, for example, the “state” was no homogeneous entity but itself the site 
of a triangular struggle among the Hashemite court, nationalist politicians, 
and the many branches of British officialdom. This was especially the case in 
frontier zones that officials struggled to render “legible,” and where the stakes 
for asserting control—having a say in border disputes and influencing foreign 
affairs—were so high.7 In these circumstances, how did sheikhs and ordinary 
5    For a contemporary example of such narratives, see AIR 10/1348, Handbook of the Southern 
Desert of Iraq, 1 January 1930. Recent scholarship, in contrast, has provided a more 
nuanced reading of these so-called “marginal” spaces. See, for example: J. Tejel Gorgas and 
C.S. Scalbert-Yücel, “Introduction.” Études Rurales (special issue “Ruralité, Urbanité et 
Violence au Kurdistan”) 186 (2011); J. Migdal, “Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints: Struggles 
to Construct and Maintain State and Social Boundaries.” In Boundaries and Belonging: States 
and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices, ed. J. Migdal (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004): 3-26.
6    In addition to the long-standing interest in how empires have depended on the cooperation 
of local elites, the recent tendency to explore European imperialism in terms of a multiplic-
ity of networks has emphasised the pluralism and competition of differing imperial agendas, 
their dependence on (often incomplete) sets of “colonial knowledge,” and the potential for 
missed connections and unfinished and conflicting enterprises. For comparative studies of 
the Middle Eastern mandates, alive to the limits of colonial power and the continuities with 
the Ottoman period, see M. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial 
Disorder After 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), and The British and French 
Mandates in Comparative Perspective, ed. N. Méouchy and P. Sluglett (Leiden: Brill, 2004).
7    For a reconstruction of the practices of “desert administration” on the frontiers of Egypt, 
Trans-Jordan, and Iraq, see R.S.G. Fletcher, British Imperialism and ‘The Tribal Question’: Desert 
Administration and Nomadic Societies in the Middle East, 1919-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University 
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Bedouin themselves perceive “the state”? And how far did their own experi-
ences and expectations of power inform the behaviour of government officials, 
often operating at the geographic limits of their authority?
The ʿAmārāt provide a fascinating case study with which to explore these 
problems. Part of the well-known ʿAnaza confederation, their migrations could 
cover a vast area of the southeastern Syrian Desert between Aleppo, Karbala, 
and the edge of the Nafūd, bordering the French mandate for Syria, the British 
mandate for Trans-Jordan, and the domains of Ibn Saʿūd. Estimates of their 
size vary considerably, from more than four thousand tents in 1919 to about 
three thousand in 1932, split between the Jabal (1700) and Dahamsha (1300) 
subdivisions.8 Either way, the ʿAmārāt’s location at the intersection of so many 
contending parties and in a terrain that interwar states still found difficult 
to control afforded them a political importance out of proportion to their 
numbers. Their sheikh in this period, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl, was widely seen 
as a shrewd political operator (“the greatest nomad potentate on the west-
ern borders of Iraq”), revered for “his wisdom and skill in tribal diplomacy.”9 
Like Nūrī al-Shaʿlān of the Ruwala, he employed a clerk to project influence 
and correspond with actors across the Syrian Desert—and there was much to 
keep abreast of. The ʿAmārāt’s history is entwined with negotiating a wealth of 
sectional, tribal, dynastic, international, and imperial interests, from old rival-
ries with the Shammar to the new factional politics of the Iraq mandate. Nor 
could Ibn Hadhdhāl take the existence of a single ʿAnaza political community 
for granted. His family, sheikhs of the Jabal subdivision, claimed a notional 
authority over the Ḍanā Bishr and, indeed, the entire ʿAnaza confederation; in 
practice, his standing among the Ḍanā Muslim (especially the Ruwala), with 
subdivisions such as the Dahamsha, and with ordinary ʿAmārāt tribesmen was 
a matter of continual negotiation. It was with reference to Ibn Hadhdhāl’s 
Press, 2015). For French Syria, see C. Velud, “French Mandate Policy in the Syrian Steppe.” 
In The Transformation of Nomadic Society in the Arab East, ed. M. Mundy and B. Musallam 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 63-81, and D. Neep, Occupying Syria under the 
French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012): 165-198.
8    British Library: India Office Records [IOR], L/P&S/10/621, J.I. Eadie, “Note on Nomad Arab 
Tribes,” 11 August 1919; G. de Gaury, Review of the ʿAnizah Tribe, ed. Bruce Ingham (Beirut: 
Kutub, 2005).
9    A.T. Wilson and G. Bell, Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia (London: HMSO, 
1920): 41;  A Handbook of Arabia, ed. G.W. Prothero (London: HMSO, 1920): 49.
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authority, after all, that Gertrude Bell described “overlordship among the 
Bedouin” as “a loose term.”10
Despite the rich potential of this political field, historical work on the 
ʿAmārāt is still patchy and incomplete. (Within the ʿAnaza, the history of the 
Ruwala is much better known.) Like all attempts to bring a Bedouin perspective 
to the foreground, it must also wrestle with formidable absences and silences, 
from the dearth of surviving Bedouin testimony to the exclusion of voices and 
the denial of alternative pasts by normatively national  historiographies.11 But 
the ʿAmārāt’s efforts to navigate a fraught political landscape did catch the 
attention of the region’s growing bureaucracies in the early twentieth century. 
Indeed, the apparent marginality of ʿAmārāt territory, located on the borders 
of multiple antagonistic parties, helped generate the paper trail that has ren-
dered them more visible. During the First World War, the ʿAmārāt operated 
along the flanks of both the British and Ottoman armies. In the 1920s, renewed 
tensions along the Iraq-Najd frontier sparked a flurry of correspondence about 
the group. These colonial records are a major source, but fragments of reported 
speech, and even some Hadhdhāl correspondence, also survive in officials’ 
private papers. Collections of tribal poetry provide a further window into the 
histories of the ʿAmārāt and their sheikhs.12 Read critically, these materials 
shed light on the leadership of Ibn Hadhdhāl and even permit us to recover 
something of the intentions, actions, and tensions among ordinary ʿAmārāt 
tribesmen.
There remain deficiencies and gaps in our sources. European accounts 
of the ʿAmārāt were irregular and superficial before the First World War. 
Thereafter, they might treat their subjects with romantic enthusiasm one 
10    Wilson and Bell, Review: 41. Johann Büssow has described the ʿAnaza as an imagined com-
munity, and one which only occasionally translated into coherent action at its largest 
possible scale: J. Büssow, “Negotiating the Future of a Bedouin Polity in Mandatory Syria: 
Political Dynamics of the Sbaʿa-ʿAbada During the 1930s.” Nomadic Peoples 15 (2011): 70-95. 
Not all European officials were insensitive to this complexity. D.G. Hogarth, the first direc-
tor of Britain’s wartime Arab Bureau, disliked referring to the ʿAnaza “as a Tribe—in the 
singular. It would be much less misleading to call them a People. . . . [T]he term Anazeh 
connotes, theoretically, a racial whole, which in practice includes several constituent 
units, politically independent of one another, and linked sentimentally by no more than a 
tradition of remote common origin”: D.G. Hogarth, “Syria. The Anazeh Tribes and Chiefs.” 
Arab Bulletin 32 (1916): 489-491.
11    See Untold Histories of the Middle East: Recovering Voices from the 19th and 20th Centuries, 
ed. A. Singer, C.K. Neumann, and S.A. Somel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
12    For example, the Hadhdhāl clan is a common point of reference in the poetry of the Ẓafīr: 
B. Ingham, Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Āl-Ḍhafīr (New York: KPI, 1986).
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 minute and colonial condescension the next.13 Oral traditions and the new 
genre of printed tribal histories, meanwhile, often say more about how tribes-
men justify their present conditions than they do about the past, and they 
require separate treatment.14 But, taken together, there is enough material to 
begin a re-examination of the impact and operation of the colonial state and 
to get a better sense of what the end of the “age of the sheikhs” actually looked 
like on the ground.15
This article focuses on three episodes in the ʿAmārāt’s history that offer 
insights into their dynamics and condition between the wars: the impact of 
war and blockade on desert trade and musābala (the seasonal journeys made 
by Bedouin to purchase supplies and sell livestock); Ibn Hadhdhāl’s efforts 
to restore the economy of raiding; and the disruption caused by the Ikhwān 
Revolt of the late 1920s, when powerful Nejdi tribes sought to check the grow-
ing influence of Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saʿūd. Before turning to these, it is worth sum-
marising what we know of the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh on the eve of the First 
World War.
Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl was about seventy years old when Gertrude Bell photo-
graphed his camp in April 1914 (Fig. 1), but she found him fully conversant on 
the state of Baghdadi politics and the future of Turkey.16 Across the nineteenth 
century, the Ottomans gave periodic support to ʿAnaza groups in return for 
protecting pilgrim caravans and to keep the power of the Shammar in check.17 
Fahd’s family had become a part of these attempts to exert Ottoman influence 
13    Colonel Gerard Leachman spent extended periods among the ʿAmārāt in 1910, 1912, and 
during the First World War, coming to refer to them as “my favourite tribe,” but made 
only cursory records of his experiences, perhaps out of secrecy: N.N.E. Bray, A Paladin of 
Arabia: The Biography of Brevet Lieut.-Colonel G.E. Leachman (London: J. Heritage, 1936): 
169. English romanticism towards the Bedouin is the subject of K. Tidrick, Heart-Beguiling 
Araby: The English Romance with Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 1981).
14    W. Lancaster, The Rwala Bedouin Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 
120; A. Shryock, “Writing Oral History in Tribal Jordan: Developments on the Margins of 
Literature Culture.” Anthropology Today 11 (1995); J. Büssow, “Bedouin Historiography in 
the Making: An Indigenous History of the Hasana Tribe in Syria.” In Repräsentationen von 
Nomaden und Sesshaften in der “Alten Welt,” ed. L. Prager (Münster: Lit, 2011): 160-183.
15    For discussions of the “myths” around tribes, see Tribes and Power: Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in the Middle East, ed. F. Abdul-Jabar and H. Dawod (London: Saqi Books, 2003); 
Al-ansâb: La quête des origines. Anthropologie historique de la société tribale arabe, ed. 
P. Bonté, E. Conte, C. Hamès, and A.W. Ould Cheikh (Paris: Editions de la Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme, 1991); P. Crone, “Tribes and States in the Middle East.” Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society 3 (1993).
16    NU, Gertrude Bell Archive, Diary: 22 April 1914.
17    See, e.g., J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ʿOman, and Central Arabia (Calcutta: 
Supt. Govt. Printing, 1908-15): 1: 1316, 1436-1438.
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south and west of the Euphrates. He inherited from his father both an Ottoman 
title and a sizable arable estate at Razāza, near Karbala, an asset vital to the 
family’s wealth and influence. But, while the Hadhdhāl clan may have acted as 
useful intermediaries for the Ottoman authorities, contact seems to have been 
limited and their autonomy and status elevated rather than compromised.18
Despite possessing extensive agricultural estates, Ibn Hadhdhāl spent sev-
eral months of the year in the desert grazing his personal herds among other 
ʿAmārāt groups. These movements went beyond those dictated by rainfall and 
markets: they allowed Ibn Hadhdhāl to renew his influence among disparate 
groups and over a large grazing territory, to demonstrate his capacity to medi-
ate disputes, and to assert his independence of distant governments. There is 
also evidence that Ibn Hadhdhāl understood such movements as an asset to 
his personal reputation, a chance to remind ordinary tribesmen of his own 
capacity to endure desert hardships.19 It followed that Ibn Hadhdhāl became a 
recognised pole of influence in the southeastern Syrian Desert—his hospitality 
well renowned (and funded by the Razāza estates), his camp a magnet for the 
18    Wilson and Bell, Review: 41; Gazetteer of Arabia: A Geographical and Tribal History of the 
Arabian Peninsula, ed. S.A. Scoville (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1979): 187.
19    See Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 419-20.
FIGURE 1 G. Bell, ‘Fahd Beg’, April, 1914. 
Source: Album Y (1913-4), Gertrude Bell Archive, Newcastle University 
Special Collections, UK. Reproduced with permission.
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disaffected and ambitious.20 In a culture in which generosity conferred power 
and prestige, one British visitor reported up to forty guests regularly dining in 
Fahd’s tent on mansaf served on a great copper plate eight feet in  diameter.21 
In the oral tradition of the Ẓafīr, who lived on the fringes of the ʿAmārāt’s influ-
ence, the Hadhdhāl sheikhs appear frequently (though not always sympatheti-
cally) as symbols of great power in the desert.22
One source of this considerable influence was the sheikh’s willingness and 
ability to restrict access to the Euphrates market towns. Tensions between the 
ʿAmārāt and the Ruwala late in 1912, for example, precluded the latter from trad-
ing at Najaf.23 Another, less everyday source of influence lay in Ibn Hadhdhāl’s 
ability to marshal an impressive show of force and to sustain it in the field. In 
1910 Gerard Leachman, a British agent tasked with making contact with Ibn 
Rashīd of Ḥāʾil, witnessed the “exceptional strength” Fahd could command, as 
the ʿAmārāt, other ʿAnaza groups, and Ibn Saʿūd clashed with the Shammar and 
Ibn Saʿdūn of the Muntafiq.24 But these shows of force carried risks as well as 
rewards: two years later, open conflict between the ʿAmārāt and the Shammar 
exacerbated tensions between the Jabal and Dahamsha subdivisions.
By the eve of the First World War, then, we see Ibn Hadhdhāl exhibiting 
many of the qualities expected of a sheikh: extending hospitality and medi-
ating disputes, securing access to grazing and markets, leading raids and 
wars, demonstrating a capacity to share in the hardships of ordinary tribesmen, 
and negotiating resources from neighbouring authorities and governments 
without surrendering his autonomy.25 In the eyes of one colonial official, that 
made Ibn Hadhdhāl “one of the most important Bedouin sheikhs in Arabia.”26 
How well this position would survive changing circumstances remained 
to be seen.
20    As Gerard Leachman and John Glubb both observed: Glubb, Arabian Adventures: 97ff.; 
Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 149.
21    MEC, John Glubb papers (2006 accession), Box 91, John Glubb, “Visit to Ga ʾara.”
22    Ingham, Bedouin of Northern Arabia: texts 5 and 10.
23    G.E. Leachman, “A Journey through Central Arabia.” The Geographical Journal 43 (1914): 
504.
24    G.E. Leachman, “A Journey in North-Eastern Arabia.” The Geographical Journal 37 (1911): 
267. See also Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 144, 153.
25    William Lancaster and Thorsten Schoel both provide useful surveys of the role of a sheikh: 
Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today: 127-30; Schoel, “Hsana’s Revenge”: 104-5.
26    Glubb, “Visit to Ga ʾara.”
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1 Trade, Blockade, and the Fortunes of War
For Bedouin groups across the Arab East, the outbreak of the First World War 
revived existing tensions and engendered new alliances. As the Syrian Desert 
became a theatre of war between the British and Ottoman empires, a key deci-
sion faced by many Bedouin sheikhs was when, and for whom, to declare. By 
procrastinating too long, they ran the risk of being seen as “wily” or duplici-
tous, something for which Nūrī al-Shaʿlān became notorious.27 To pledge sup-
port too soon, however, risked being perceived as a mere retainer, or hitching 
one’s wagon to a falling star.
Ibn Hadhdhāl was typical in facing this choice but conspicuously successful 
in navigating the options. While the British would later claim him as their nat-
ural ally in the Shāmiyya desert south and west of the Euphrates, he kept them 
guessing as the Allied campaign in Mesopotamia floundered. Throughout 1916 
and into 1917, when Bedouin groups in the Hijaz began to work with Allied 
forces, Britain’s intelligence organisation in Cairo, the Arab Bureau, contin-
ued to rank the ʿAmārāt sheikh as “doubtful,” even “pro-Turk,” and acting with 
“characteristic caution.”28 It was only with the fall of Baghdad in March 1917 
that Ibn Hadhdhāl declared in Britain’s favour. Even then, British agents com-
plained that he was by no means complaisant, “as he will promise everything 
and do nothing.”29
That spring, it was hard to know what the relationship between tribal 
sheikh and occupying power would look like (or even which party had the 
most to gain). British expectations were hardly exacting. Sir Arnold Wilson, 
later the Civil Commissioner in Iraq, recalled the official lack of interest in 
“Arab co-operation” schemes on the Mesopotamian front, many calculating 
that the potential military advantage was “more than off-set . . . by the probable 
reactions after the war.”30 For the British and Indian forces fighting their way 
through Mesopotamia, it was enough that the ʿAmārāt on their western flank 
remained “quiet” and “unresponsive” to German overtures, even if the ʿAnaza 
“did little . . . as regards active military operations against the Turks or their 
27    The Ruwala did not assist British operations in the Middle East until shortly before the 
armistice.
28    D.G. Hogarth, “Northern Desert: Jauf el-Amr from East and West.” Arab Bulletin 33 (1916): 
503; K. Cornwallis (ed.), “The Desert. Movements in East and Centre.” Arab Bulletin 44 
(1917): 118-9; G.L. Bell, “Mesopotamia. Ismail Bey.” Arab Bulletin 45 (1917): 133.
29    Anon., “Notes. Mesopotamia News.” Arab Bulletin 79 (1918): 56.
30    A.T. Wilson, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties; a Personal and Historical Record 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1931): 3-4.
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allies.”31 Fahd’s camp did, however, become an important source of informa-
tion for the British on desert movements and conditions, as various Bedouin 
groups fled towards him from Ottoman territory.32
For the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh, in contrast, the British connection brought 
access to more concrete resources. Ibn Hadhdhāl received a personal subsidy 
of twelve thousand rupees a month and protection for his cultivated estates: 
a more regular income, one officer calculated, than that collected as khuwwa 
before the war.33 More importantly, British goodwill saw the ʿAmārāt through 
the disastrous winter of 1917-18. It is hard to overstate the impact this had on 
Bedouin across the Arab East, as crop failures, locust plagues, wartime requisi-
tions, and an Allied blockade combined in a perfect storm of famine and des-
titution. ʿAnaza groups crossed the Syrian Desert from west to east to escape 
these depredations: at one stage, perhaps as many as 100,000 Bedouin were 
being fed by the British authorities in Mesopotamia.34 Through their sheikh’s 
support for the British war effort, the ʿAmārāt secured vital supplies of dates 
and grain and were spared the worst of the shortages.35
Power, prestige, and influence were remarkably fluid in the vacuum 
between the Ottoman retreat and the British advance. As Britain’s administra-
tive responsibilities in Mesopotamia began to outstrip its knowledge of the 
country, the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh were able to turn their peripheral loca-
tion into a political asset. In 1917, the ease with which enemy supplies passed 
through the Syrian Desert became of increasing concern to the British. Their 
reports hint at the scale of the problem, with large caravans setting out from 
31    D.G. Hogarth, “Obituary: Lieut.-Colonel G.E. Leachman.” The Geographical Journal 56 
(1920): 326; Wilson and Bell, Review: 41.
32    For example: K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Notes. News of Anazeh Tribes.” Arab Bulletin 65 (1917): 
407-408.
33    Glubb, Arabian Adventures: 61. Khuwwa, often dismissed as mere extortion, was, in fact, 
the payment made to a Bedouin group, in cash or in kind, to opt out of the economy of 
raiding. See Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today: 121ff.
34    Wilson, Mesopotamia: 79. The motivating factor of food security is crucial to Tariq Tell’s 
analysis of Bedouin wartime politics on the other side of the Syrian Desert: T. Tell, “Guns, 
Gold and Grain: War and Food Supply in the Making of Transjordan.” In War, Institutions 
and Social Change in the Middle East, ed. S. Heydemann (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000). Vivid first-hand accounts of conditions in wartime Greater Syria are found in 
S. Tamari, Year of the Locust: A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of Palestine’s Ottoman Past 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
35    In contrast, when the Fadʿān and Sbaʿa made it to Iraq late in 1917, they “arrived starving”: 
IOR: L/P&S/10/618, anon. [probably G. Leachman], “Anizah on the Iraq Frontier,” n.d.
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Kuwait, Karbala, and Najaf for Ḥāʾil, Aleppo, and Damascus.36 Lacking the 
expertise or the influence to stop these flows, the British asked Ibn Hadhdhāl 
to identify smugglers and intercept contraband on their behalf. He seized the 
opportunity.37 The ʿAmārāt’s role in regulating desert trade became their most 
important contribution to the Allied cause. It also provides a window onto the 
sheikh’s attempts to navigate the war, the ʿAmārāt’s condition in the immedi-
ate post-war years, and the persistence of pre-war political dynamics within 
the conduct of the war itself.
The Anglo-ʿAmārāt control regime was run through a system of issuing 
passes, monitoring migrations, and despatching desert patrols. Permits to draw 
supplies from the markets under government control were issued directly by 
the British authorities or indirectly through confederate sheikhs, Ibn Hadhdhāl 
prominent among them.38 Those caught carrying supplies without a pass or 
deviating from their declared destination were liable to be detained and to 
have their supplies seized; in some instances, ʿAmārāt groups attacked sus-
pected smugglers and kept the supplies for themselves. The system aimed to 
starve the Ottoman armies of materiel, but also to prevent Iraq’s own harvest 
from “leaking into the desert,” lured by the near-famine prices prevailing in 
Bilād al-Shām.39 It similarly targeted the activities of the Ottomans’ Arab allies, 
including Ibn Rashīd of the Shammar, who professed hostility to Britain in the 
name of Ottoman authority, while profiting from its absence.40 The evidence is 
fragmentary, but these efforts appear to have had some effect on the Ottomans 
and their allies.41 Ibn Hadhdhāl, however, was motivated by something less 
than loyalty.
At a basic level, by supporting the blockade, the sheikh put the politi-
cal advantage of increased British goodwill above the short-term pecuniary 
36    G.L. Bell, “Mesopotamia. The Situation in Hail.” Arab Bulletin 57 (1917): 314-316.
37    Glubb, “Visit to Ga ʾara.”
38    Ibn Hadhdhāl became increasingly important as evidence of Kuwaiti and Saudi partici-
pation in smuggling grew and once the Ottoman garrison at Medina fell and the war front 
shifted further north.
39    K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Mesopotamia. The Najaf-Kerbala district.” Arab Bulletin 62 (1917): 
373-375.
40    G. Bell, “Arabia. North-Eastern Desert, Tribal Fights in the Shamiyah.” Arab Bulletin 43 
(1917): 87-95.
41    The large desert caravans were increasingly disrupted, although officials accepted that 
smuggling continued “where Fahd Beg had not yet established control,” itself a sign of his 
growing influence: K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Mesopotamia: Affairs at Kerbala.” Arab Bulletin 69 
(1917): 453-454.
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 advantages of smuggling.42 This earned him valuable political capital, which 
he was not hesitant to cash in. In a letter describing Colonel Leachman, the 
British officer attached to his camp in this period, he pointed out that the 
ʿAmārāt’s record of intercepting Ottoman contraband had rightly reassured 
the authorities “as to our friendship to the British Government.”43 Less prom-
inent ʿAmārāt tribesmen may not always have been as restrained or as con-
cerned for British opinion: some were caught releasing smugglers in exchange 
for payment.44 But, in general, their contribution to the blockade guaranteed 
them preferential access to Euphrates markets for the remainder of the war. It 
is this concern for keeping markets open for his tribesmen, more than anything 
else, that explains the timing of Ibn Hadhdhāl’s decision to declare for Great 
Britain.45 But the ʿAmārāt’s role in enforcing the blockade hints at deeper con-
nections between trade, influence, and Bedouin authority, agendas that were 
never fully lost beneath the ebb and flow of the war.
The first connection concerns the relationship between a sheikh’s capacity 
to secure access to markets and the degree of his political authority. ʿAnaza 
sheikhs had long sought to control the approaches to Euphrates markets for 
political as well as economic ends. British victories in the riverine zone threat-
ened this position—their officers fell into established patterns of withhold-
ing access to extract Bedouin “compliance”—but Fahd’s active role in this 
42    Nūrī al-Shaʿlān’s son Nawwaf, in contrast, was thought to be “up to his neck in the contra-
band business”: K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Notes. Kuweit-Damascus Contraband.” Arab Bulletin 
91 (1918): 180-181.
43    Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl correspondence, cited in Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 302-3. The prov-
enance of this correspondence, which concerns the time spent by Colonel Leachman 
among the ʿAmārāt, is now lost. Norman Bray, who reproduces it in his biography of 
Leachman, was himself drawing on materials collected by Sir Arnold Wilson and St John 
Philby. It seems probable that one or the other of these two—both of whom also knew 
Fahd—had asked the sheikh for his memories of Leachman and the war, probably soon 
after Leachman’s death in 1920. As a rare example of the testimony of a sheikh from this 
period, these recollections are as interesting for their assumptions about what makes a 
good leader and for how the sheikh describes his relationship with the state as for their 
depiction of wartime events and personalities.
44    K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Notes. Damascus-Hail Caravan Traffic.” Arab Bulletin 102 (1918): 308.
45    The British accepted as much and did not consider Ibn Hadhdhāl “likely to come in with 
us till our frontier on both Euphrates and Tigris is far enough advanced . . . to control the 
Amarat markets”: Hogarth, “Anazeh Tribes and Chiefs”: 491. Even so, there is evidence that 
Ibn Hadhdhāl was concerned about becoming dependent on the British for supplies and 
may have approached Ibn Saʿūd, through his nephew Fahd al-Dughaym, to establish an 
alternate source through the Arabian region of Qaṣīm: K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Supplies from 
Qasim.” Arab Bulletin 97 (1918): 256.
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desert trade system more than won it back.46 With the exception of British 
political officers, he alone was now permitted to issue passes to trade and 
conduct musābala with the principal market towns of the Euphrates. Due 
to the disruption to economic life caused by the war, and with the growing 
apparatus of British bureaucracy at his side, Ibn Hadhdhāl’s influence was, if 
anything, increased. From the autumn of 1917 onwards, shortages drove the 
Fadʿān and Sbaʿa “rallying towards Ibn Hadhdhāl.” By October, the ʿAmārāt had 
been granted a near monopoly over the carrying trade between Kuwait and 
Iraq.47 Even the Ruwala, who had long exercised considerable autonomy of 
the nominal ʿAnaza chief, and who were loath “to be beholden in any way to 
Fahad in the procuring of supplies,” had to set aside their differences with the 
ʿAmārāt to access Mespotamian markets.48 By the end of the war, the ʿAmārāt 
were involved in seizing contraband and dispatching agents throughout 
Iraq’s Southern Desert, welcoming groups from even further afield and selling 
camels and other pastoral products to supply Sherifian forces. It is a good indi-
cation of the wealth, influence, and largesse that flowed from this position 
that Ibn Saʿūd eyed it covetously and was, by 1918, requesting equal rights and 
privileges.49
The second dynamic operating throughout the Anglo-ʿAmārāt blockade was 
the ongoing rivalry between the ʿAnaza and the Shammar. This enmity had 
deep roots. Since the early eighteenth century, groups affiliated with both of 
these great Bedouin confederations clashed as they moved north from Arabia 
into the Syrian Desert. Driven by political instability and climatic stress, the 
Shammar were gradually pushed across the Euphrates and into the Jazīra.50 
These successive waves of migration formed the human landscape into which 
46    “It is this need of laying in stocks of supplies,” a British report confessed frankly, “that gives 
the Governments of ʿIraq and Syria their main hold over these birds of the desert”: IOR: 
L/PS/10/621, Eadie, “Nomad Arab Tribes.”
47    K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Notes. Koweit Supplies.” Arab Bulletin 70 (1917): 468.
48    K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Notes. News of Anazeh Tribes.” Arab Bulletin 65 (1917): 407-8. See also 
Wilson and Bell, Review: 41.
49    R.E. Hamilton (political agent, Kuwait), notes reproduced in K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Ibn Saud 
and His Neighbours.” Arab Bulletin 92 (1918): 187-92. Yoav Alon has also observed how “the 
precarious leadership position” of many sheikhs obliged them “to attract the sponsorship 
of some higher authority”: Alon, “Silent Voices”: 93.
50    De Gaury, Review of ʿAnizah: 22; Franz, “Bedouin in History”: 35; Ingham, Bedouin of 
Northern Arabia: 12-14. From the 1830s, the ʿAmārāt and other ʿAnaza groups regularly 
sided with the Āl Saʿūd against the Rashīd dynasty of the Shammar; as recently as 1910 
there had been open conflict between the two: Büssow, “Negotiating”: 65. See also 
Lorimer, Gazetteer: 1501.
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European imperialism now crashed; for some years after the region’s partition, 
its consequences would continue to play out. For the ʿAmārāt, Ibn Hadhdhāl’s 
control of the wartime blockade provided a new economic weapon in this 
long struggle. Shammar groups allied to the Ottomans complained about 
their restricted freedom of movement and inability to access Euphrates mar-
kets. Some initially found relief in smuggling, but from 1917 their loss of access 
to Najaf and Samāwa took an increasingly heavy toll.51 Even after the war, as 
we shall see, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl clung to the pass system as a way of staying 
ahead of the Shammar in a revived competition for opportunities, resources, 
and patronage.
Finally, the workings of the pass system also provide an insight into estab-
lished tensions within the ʿAmārāt—in particular, Fahd’s attempts to retain 
influence over the Dahamsha. In the past, the sheikhs of this subdivision had 
claimed to be equal in importance to Ibn Hadhdhāl himself, wintering in sepa-
rate grazing grounds and enjoying considerable independence of his authority.52 
During the war, one group of Dahamsha, under Muḥammad Ibn Turkī, chose 
to camp with the pro-Turk ʿUjaymi al-Saʿdūn. Another, under Muḥammad Ibn 
Mijlad, offered to join King Hussein in the Hijaz “in order to get round our 
arrangement with Fahad Ibn Hadhdhāl.”53 This, Fahd told the British, angered 
him more than any amount of Shammar raiding.54 He responded by using the 
pass system, and the threat of withholding permission to trade, in an attempt 
to rein in the autonomy of these sheikhs. Nor was he afraid to lean on Britain 
for support when faced with disobedience. Well into the 1920s, the British 
observed Ibn Hadhdhāl using trade “as a lever for political purposes . . . with 
a view to giving him control over the Aneizah,” and while there is evidence of 
evasion of the pass system in the later 1920s, it enabled him to act as a kind of 
gatekeeper for some years more.55
51    IOR: L/P&S/12/2082, G. de Gaury, “Note on the Shammar Tribe, Jebel Shammar and the 
Ibn Rashid Dynasty of Hail now in Abeyance,” 29 June 1937.
52    Before the war, British authorities in Kuwait simply assumed that the Dahamsha were as 
important as Ibn Hadhdhāl, while, during the war, Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca corresponded 
with Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl and Muḥammad Ibn Mijlad as equals: Lorimer, Gazetteer: IIA, 
83; K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Intelligence.” Arab Bulletin 52 (1917): 251.
53    H.St.J.B. Philby, The Heart of Arabia: A Record of Travel and Exploration (London: 
Constable, 1922): 256; K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Ramadi and the Tribes.” Arab Bulletin 70 (1917): 
459-60; K. Cornwallis (ed.), “Mesopotamian Chiefs and King Husein.” Arab Bulletin 93 
(1918): 211-2.
54    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
55    MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 4, file 9, Ramadi reports: 22 March 1923. It testified to his 
newfound buying power that when, in 1923, Fahd shifted suppliers, redirecting the bulk of 
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The Dahamsha openly criticised this new state of affairs—Ibn Hadhdhāl, 
they claimed, had become “too self-assured”—and quickly identified the pass 
system as a major grievance.56 By 1923 several Bedouin groups were reported to 
have changed their musābala patterns rather than “submit to the indignity of 
soliciting permission from Fahad Beg.”57 When Ibn Turki attempted, in 1926, to 
circumvent the system, threatening to move to Najd if the government did not 
withdraw it, Fahd even had a British official sent to impress on the sheikh “the 
futility of trying to kick against Fahad’s control.”58
Interestingly, the British were aware that they, and the pass system, were 
being played in this way. One report freely accepted that their close relation-
ship with any given sheikh would inevitably distort his relations with others.59 
They even appreciated that embittered Dahamsha sheikhs were well placed 
to relocate beyond their effective jurisdiction and wished that, in the interests 
of amity, Fahd might “exercise himself a little more and Government a little 
less.”60 But it is a reminder of the weakness of Britain’s position in the desert 
that, for the time being at least, they stood by Ibn Hadhdhāl. He had, in British 
eyes, “long been the main stabilising factor in the Anizah areas”; should the 
Dahamsha be allowed to break away “Fahad declares that it will be the begin-
ning of unsettlement throughout the Anizah.”61
The inner workings of the Anglo-ʿAmārāt blockade reveal how important 
Bedouin agendas and concerns continued to operate throughout the turmoil 
of the First World War. It would also set the tone for the tribe’s interactions 
with the occupying power in the immediate post-war years. By the mid-1920s, 
we can glimpse the ʿAmārāt sheikh acting as a mediator in numerous disputes. 
He supported government claims during the Dayr al-Zūr crisis, a tense stand-
off with Arab nationalist forces in the Iraqi-Syrian borderlands. In the south, 
he took in refugee tribesmen at the government’s request and confiscated 
loot from those raiding into Najd, all the while preserving his own contacts.62 
trade to Shetatah instead of Rahaliyah, the latter town witnessed scenes of disorder and 
discontent.
56    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
57    AIR 10/1348, Handbook: 112. From 1919 to 1923 most of the Dahamsha under Ibn Mijlad, 
equally indignant, camped in Syria.
58    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925, 27 August 1925; AIR 23/294, 
Moore to ‘I’ Branch, 28 September 1926.
59    IOR: L/P&S/10/619: Political Officer, Hillah, “The Future of the Tribal System”.
60    AIR 23/294, Moore to ‘I’ Branch, 28 September 1926.
61    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
62    In 1922 at the Uqair conference, and in 1923 at al-Qa ʾim and Dayr al-Zūr, Ibn Hadhdhāl was 
seen as attempting to act “in his now universally established role of general peacemaker 
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Throughout, what stands out are the opportunities afforded the ʿAmārāt and 
their sheikh as the state of flux that had marked the war years survived the pro-
cess of partition.63 Britain’s limited penetration of Iraq’s southern and western 
frontiers, its unfamiliarity with the country’s topography and personalities, the 
political and fiscal pressures to withdraw its troops, the twin distractions of 
Turkish revanchism and Kurdish unrest, and its fears of a desert awash with 
modern rifles, all pushed in the direction of allowing prominent sheikhs wide 
autonomy in the conduct of their affairs. There were, after all, worse people 
to back. As a substantial livestock owner, officers reasoned, Ibn Hadhdhāl 
would necessarily “favour quiet tribal conditions,” while his “tactful friend-
ship” with Ibn Saʿūd afforded “a useful and convenient channel of approach” 
between two governments that did not yet formally recognise one another.64 
Allowing prominent ʿAnaza sheikhs such latitude “might well shock French 
theorists of suzerainty,” an intelligence officer concluded, but were it to cease 
“the Administration would have no other machinery available.”65
2 “Rules for Raiders”: Patronage and Politicking in the Mid-1920s
The war had been good to Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl, but he could not afford to be 
complacent. His position depended upon balancing the goodwill of the colo-
nial power with the support of ordinary tribesmen. As the decade wore on, 
that meant navigating a path through the government’s growing anxieties 
about Bedouin raiding.
For the British officials based in Baghdad, raiding was seen, by turns, as 
harmless sport, a menace to “law and order,” an expression of desert anar-
chy, and a threat to the conduct of foreign policy (or, by some around the 
Hashemite court, as a way of conducting that policy by other means). It was a 
stated condition of Ibn Hadhdhāl’s lucrative subsidy that he prevent his tribes-
men from conducting raids. Among the Bedouin of the Arab East, however, 
raiding itself fulfilled a vital economic function, as a mechanism for  recouping 
herd losses and redistributing wealth. It was Ibn Hadhdhāl’s bold attempt to 
and diplomat”: MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 4, File 9: 18 May 1923. For mention of Ibn 
Hadhdhal’s part in the Dayr al-Zūr crisis of 1919-20, see E. Tauber, “The Struggle for Dayr 
al-Zūr: The Determination of Borders between Syria and Iraq.” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 23 (1991).
63    Prothero, Handbook of Arabia: 6.
64    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
65    CO 730/105/1, Intelligence Report no. 3, “Syrian Frontier,” 4 February 1926. Theory aside, the 
French mandatory regime also relied on sheikhs’ collaboration: Velud, “French Mandate.”
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square these two constituencies—to satisfy both Baghdad’s calls to uphold 
“law and order” and his supporters’ concern for the economy of raiding—that 
gave rise to one of the most remarkable experiments in government in the his-
tory of the mandates.
Late in the summer of 1925, flights of British aircraft flew over the southern 
and western deserts of Iraq, dropping bundles of leaflets on the Bedouin below. 
The leaflets announced, to those who could read them, an end to the authori-
ties’ attempts to outlaw tribal raiding. Instead, the government of Iraq would 
now tolerate “internal” raiding between the ʿAnaza, Shammar, and Ẓafīr. As 
long as raiding parties remained within national borders, gave notice of their 
targets, avoided main roads, and left settled populations and travellers alone, 
raiding and counter-raiding would not be treated as a crime. Improbable as 
it may sound, these conditions were assembled in a printed list of “Rules for 
Raiders” and dropped over selected Bedouin camps. Intelligence officers and 
police posts were issued with logbooks and instructed to keep a record of who 
raided what from whom. Only “external” raiding, given its implications for 
foreign relations, would require intervention. The distinction, meaningless to 
most Bedouin groups, became cemented by legislation in September 1925.66
The experiment was controversial, even in its day.67 Officials soon confessed 
their difficulties in registering raiding parties and in separating “internal” raid-
ing from “external” consequences. They struggled to distinguish trans-border 
raids from “the large numbers of raids which are constantly coming and going,” 
while a system permitting certain tribes to raid in certain circumstances sim-
ply added to the confusion of authority in the desert.68 Groups long thought 
to have “abandoned” raiding were motivated to take up arms once more. 
Before long, reports were received of unauthorised raids conducted outside 
the “Rules.” Attacks on caravans, travellers, and settled tribes proved “lamen-
tably frequent”; a “welter of blood feuds” ensued. In July 1926, the scheme was 
scrapped; it had lasted less than a year.69
66    Glubb, Arabian Adventures: 84-91; A.B. Toth, The Transformation of a Pastoral Economy: 
Bedouin and States in Northern Arabia, 1850-1950 (PhD diss. Oxford University, 2000): 
169-171.
67    “Armed with blue pencil and typewriter,” John Glubb remembered of his time as a Special 
Service Officer in southern Iraq, officials “divided themselves into rival camps”: MEC, John 
Glubb papers 3(205)/7, J.B. Glubb, “Authorised Raiding”. 
68    FO 371/12993, Plumer to Amery, 20 April 1928; AIR 23/300, Glubb to Air Staff Intelligence, 
18 February 1926.
69    AIR 23/375, anon., “Draft Circular to all Mutasarrifs,” 29 July 1926; CO 730/105/9, Air 
Headquarters, “Summary of Intelligence no. 33,” 16 August 1926; CO 730/78, CO 46166, 
Intelligence Report no. 20, 1 October 1925.
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The “Rules for Raiders” episode barely features in most histories of Iraq 
and, where it does, is easily dismissed as a flight of imperial fancy.70 There 
is something hubristic, even absurd, in the image of British aircraft scatter-
ing pamphlets across a windblown desert; it recalls Joseph Conrad’s gunboat 
on the edge of the African bush, “firing into a continent.” Yet such a reading 
treats the Bedouin themselves too lightly: it fails to acknowledge how much 
this most unorthodox of policy proscriptions owed to Bedouin pressures and 
interests. Viewed in the appropriate context, the “Rules for Raiders” scheme is 
a telling example of how Bedouin political and economic agendas could still 
drive interwar politics. To see this, we must locate the scheme at the junction 
of three forces that were buffeting the young mandate for Iraq: the revived 
competition for resources between the ʿAmārāt and the Shammar; the political 
pluralism of the mandatory regime; and ongoing tensions within the ʿAmārāt 
themselves.
Before the state developed a comprehensive, bureaucratic system of “desert 
administration,” Iraq’s Southern Desert remained a contested space between 
British officialdom, Saudi expansionism, the Hashemite court, and the 
Bedouin themselves. The stakes were high for all the parties. For the British, 
much of their influence in the Middle East rested on balancing the goodwill 
of Ibn Saʿūd and their evolving relationship with the Hashemites. The Foreign 
Office and India Office, in particular, were anxious to keep the emir of Najd 
on side: his “more or less ordered” rule offered the best protection for impe-
rial communications, the “independence” of the Persian Gulf and, after Ibn 
Saʿūd’s capture of Mecca and Medina, the quiescence of India’s Muslims.71 The 
Hashemite King Fayṣal of Iraq, in contrast, watched the rise of Ibn Saʿūd with 
alarm. He saw the Bedouin groups along his southern frontier as the most 
ready means of containing, even countering, the threat of Saudi expansion. 
Ibn Saʿūd, for his part, was determined to avoid being encircled to the north by 
an arc of hostile Hashemite states. In April 1921, even as Fayṣal’s candidacy for 
the Iraqi throne was being announced, Ibn Saʿūd wrote to Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl 
claiming authority over all the ʿAnaza.72 As these forces jostled for authority 
70    For John Glubb, the scheme was the product of the romantic enthusiasm of “the League 
Football school of thought”: Glubb, Arabian Adventures: 90-1. See also his criticism, at the 
time, of the naivety and “ridiculous ignorance” of the authorities in Baghdad: MEC, John 
Glubb papers (2006 accession), Box 43, Mesopotamia Diary: 2 December 1925.
71    CO 831/22/2, Cunliffe-Lister to Wauchope (1 February 1933).
72    FO 371/12993, “A Short History of ʿIraq-Najd Relations from about the Time of the Fall of 
Hail to Ibn Saʿud’s Protest against the Establishment of the ʿIraq Police Post at Busaiyah,” 
encl. in H. Dobbs to L. Amery, 14 April 1928; FO 371/13715, Ibn Saʿūd to Gilbert Clayton, 
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along the Iraq-Najd frontier, they perpetuated that wartime state of flux, and 
engendered new patterns of patronage, preference, and opportunity. For the 
ʿAmārāt in particular, this would re-energise old enmities with the Shammar.
With the fall of Ḥāʾil to Ibn Saʿūd’s forces in November 1921, Saudi power was 
being projected into the Syrian Desert for the first time in a century, pressing 
on the frontiers of the Hashemite domains of Trans-Jordan and Iraq. Several 
Shammar groups associated with the defeated Ibn Rashīd now fled north into 
Iraq. Many passed through the ʿAmārāt to join the Iraqi Shammar in the Jazīra; 
others remained in ʿAmārāt territory and in the vicinity of the frontier. Once 
in Iraq, however, their hostility to Saudi expansion found a welcome audience 
in the king. Keen to develop desert connections independent of British con-
trol, Fayṣal came to look on the Shammar as his proxy on the frontier, the best 
instrument available for checking Saudi power. If land grants formed the key 
currency of Fayṣal’s relationship with rural notables, then permission to raid 
was now being made to work the same way for Bedouin sheikhs. In 1923 the 
king permitted Shammar groups under ʿAjīl al-Yāwir to raise a desert force to 
guard the Euphrates line. The following year, he invited al-Yāwir to patrol the 
Nāṣiriyya and Dīwāniyya provinces (liwāʾs) and repel any attacks by Ikhwān 
from across the border.73 Before long, he was giving his tacit approval to illicit 
Shammar raids into Najd itself.74 The ʿAmārāt were not simply shut out of 
these lucrative opportunities; they feared they would ultimately face the brunt 
of Saudi reprisals.
The British were “gravely embarrassed” by these events, fearful of the 
damage that Fayṣal and the Shammar might do to their own relationship 
with Ibn Saʿūd, yet they still baulked at the cost and risk of developing their 
own administrative presence in the desert. So they too tried their hand at man-
aging the desert through patronage. Both ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of the Shammar and 
Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl of the ʿAmārāt were offered official subsidies to strengthen 
their hold over their respective followers, curb Bedouin raiding (especially 
those “embarrassing” trans-border affairs), and monitor the country’s new 
24 April 1929. For the genealogical ties of the house of Saud to the ʿAnaza, see T. Ashkenazi, 
“The ʿAnazah Tribes.” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 4 (1948): 226. The best account 
of Saudi expansionism and the early Saudi state remains: J. Kostiner, The Making of Saudi 
Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993).
73    FO 371/12993, “Short History of ʿIraq-Najd Relations”; MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 206, 
File 10, John Glubb, “Notes on Scheme for Tribal Irregulars—Dulaim Division” n.d. [1923]; 
AIR 23/291, Lees to Air Staff Intelligence, 20 February 1925.
74    FO 371/12993, “Short History of ʿIraq-Najd Relations”; AIR 23/38, Buss minute, 31 March 
1928.
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trans- desert routes.75 Al-Yāwir ultimately proved unable (or disinclined) to 
prevent the Shammar from raiding, but Ibn Hadhdhāl became increasingly 
important to Britain, upholding its interests along Iraq’s frontiers while tem-
pering Fayṣal’s influence.76 When they invited the sheikh to establish and man 
desert outposts at Muhaywir and Rutba, the British were effectively underwrit-
ing a parallel source of authority in the desert, shadowing a Shammari “Desert 
Police” favoured by the king.77
The arrangement had advantages for the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh. For Ibn 
Hadhdhāl, the position again helped his standing as a man of influence on the 
frontiers of Iraq. He accepted it only on the condition that the government 
be prepared to underwrite his authority, with police support if necessary.78 The 
patrols, meanwhile, provided a means of checking Shammar activity while 
renewing the sheikh’s private contacts with Ibn Saʿūd. As the man responsible 
for confiscating and restoring loot raided from Najd (including on the numer-
ous raids made by the Shammar refugees), he entered an active correspon-
dence with Ibn Saʿūd’s governor at Ḥāʾil, taking care to distinguish his actions 
from those of the Hashemite regime.79 Little wonder, then, that the Hadhdhāl 
clan came to be viewed “with suspicion and dislike at the Palace.”80
For ordinary ʿAmārāt tribesmen too, the patrols formed part of an ongo-
ing struggle for subsidies and positions—a form of maintaining markets, as 
William Lancaster observed.81 They guaranteed the ʿAmārāt’s access to the 
important springs and wells at Muhaywir, while some also saw an opportunity 
to keep for themselves the camels seized from raiders and to pursue old vendet-
tas against the Shammar.82 These patrols also addressed the favouritism with 
which the police recruited heavily from among the Shammar and then turned 
75    M.F. Jamali, The New Iraq: Its Problem of Bedouin Education (New York: Teachers College, 
Columbia, 1934): 65.
76    Al-Yāwir’s subsidy was halved and the funds spent on a unit of armed patrol cars instead: 
CO 730/105/1, Iraq Political Intelligence Report no. 16 (3 August 1926).
77    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 22 October 1925.
78    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
79    For Ibn Hadhdhāl’s “constant” communications with Ibn Saʿūd, see MEC, H.R.P. Dickson 
papers, Box 2/A, File 3: H.R.P. Dickson, “Annual Report on the Hillah Liwa for the Year 
1921” [n.d.].
80    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 27 August 1925; AIR 23/38, K. Buss minute, 
31 March 1928.
81    Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today: 131.
82    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 22 October 1925.
 183The ʿAmārāt, their Sheikh, and the Colonial State
jesho 58 (2015) 163-199
a blind eye to Shammari raids (including those against the ʿAmārāt).83 As the 
British intelligence officer at Ramadi observed, Ibn Hadhdhāl was plainly “jeal-
ous that the [Dulaym] Desert Police should contain such a preponderance 
of Shammar (Nejdi, be it noted, not Jazireh) over Anaiza”: if he could not do 
something to redress this, his influence would necessarily suffer.84
By the summer of 1925, however, there were signs that ʿAmārāt frustration 
was beginning to boil over. Ibn Hadhdhāl’s undertaking to prevent ʿAmārāt 
raids brought him recognition and financial rewards from the government, 
but it now began to erode his authority among ordinary tribesmen. In June, a 
group of ʿAmārāt raided the Shammar near Ramadi, tired of putting up with 
Shammar raids. When confronted about this by British officials, the ʿAmārāt 
claimed, not without grounds, that Shammar raids had, for too long, been pro-
tected by their close connections with the government police.85 Ibn Hadhdhāl 
now weighed in, accusing ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of breaking a recent truce, and tell-
ing the Special Service Officer “how delighted he would be if the Government 
would openly countenance raiding so that he could get his own back.”86
This was not simply a question of self-defence. Resources may have been 
particularly scarce in the summer and autumn of 1925. ʿAjīl al-Yāwir confessed 
he could not prevent the Shammar from raiding because “food is scarce, 
grazing is poor, and hunger and poverty [are] driving his people to crime.”87 
It seems likely that similar pressures were acting upon Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl: 
it pushed him to seek a restoration of the economy of raiding, not least to 
shore up support among members of his own tribe. It is particularly signifi-
cant that it was the Dahamsha sheikhs—those most impatient with Hadhdhāl 
control—who were most anxious to see raiding restored. Until recently, it was 
they who had been “constantly raiding into the Jazireh, and on the whole they 
were more successful than the Shammar.”88 They complained expressly about 
the injustice of a situation in which Fahd profited handsomely from his gov-
ernment subsidy but, by preventing raiding, seemed to be denying others the 
opportunity of enriching themselves. In the fluid, multi-polar Middle East that 
partition had helped create, no sheikh could afford to ignore such sentiments 
for long. Throughout the 1920s, groups disgruntled with Hadhdhāl’s  ascendancy 
83    For a breakdown of the composition of this force, see MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 206, 
File 10, John Glubb, “Report on the Dulaim Desert Force,” 17 March 1923.
84    AIR 23/292, Special Service Officer [SSO] Ramadi report, 20 June 1925.
85    AIR 23/292, SSO to Aviation Baghdad, telegram, 19 June 1925, 8 October 1925.
86    AIR 23/292, SSO Ramadi report, 20 June 1925.
87    CO 730/79, CO49541, Intelligence Report no. 21, 15 October 1925.
88    AIR 23/292, SSO Ramadi report, 20 June 1925.
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were prepared to seek out alternative sources of influence, wealth, and lar-
gesse; in 1923, for example, Dahamsha “dissatisfied with the Government of 
Iraq favouring . . . Ibn Hadhdhāl” had visited Ibn Saʿūd in Najd.89
All this forced Ibn Hadhdhāl to act in the economic interests of ordinary 
tribesmen. In July 1925, Fahd sent his son Maḥrūt to Baghdad to request offi-
cial permission “to protect themselves from Shammar aggression.” Maḥrūt 
claimed the ʿAnaza had lost some two thousand camels to these raids in recent 
months and sought to draw on his father’s influence with the British to have 
at least some of them restored.90 Early in August, Fahd received word that the 
government would attempt to recover the loot from the Shammar and that, 
if its efforts proved unsuccessful, counter-raids might be permitted “to make 
good their losses.”91 Meanwhile, Maḥrūt remained in the capital, pressing his 
complaints and urging the resumption of raiding. On 24 August, his lobbying 
paid off. Both Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl and ʿAjīl al-Yāwir of the Shammar were 
summoned before the High Commissioner, and during the discussion that 
followed it became
quite clear that both shaikhs wished to be freed from the undertaking 
which they had given to the ʿ Iraq Government last winter that they would 
prevent raiding between their tribes. They preferred to revert to a state 
of open warfare on the ground that their tribes wished it; and under the 
present restraint were falling away from them and taking themselves to 
Syrian territory where such warfare is not interfered with. Both shaikhs 
declared that, unless their tribes were permitted to carry on their tradi-
tional raiding, they would not be able to keep them together under them 
and the bulk would desert to Syrian territory. They agreed that if this 
state of warfare were permitted, they would not bother the government 
with complaints against each other but would recognise that their only 
redress lay in retaliation and counter raids.92
89    FO 371/13715, John Glubb, “Seduction of Iraq Tribes by Ibn Saud,” 19 March 1929. For 
Ibn Saʿūd’s conscious policy of welcoming such groups, see J. Kostiner, “Britain and the 
Northern Frontier of the Saudi State, 1922-1925.” In The Great Powers in the Middle East, 
1919-1939, ed. U. Dann (London: Holmes & Meier, 1988): 42.
90    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 30 July 1925.
91    AIR 23/292, H. James to Air Staff Intelligence, 13 August 1925.
92    CO 730/78, CO42934, Intelligence Report no. 18, 3 September 1925.
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The High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, responded with a set of conditions, 
and the ministry and the government were yet to make it all legal, but the 
“Rules for Raiders” had essentially been set.
Ibn Hadhdhāl’s intervention was crucial in overturning British reservations 
about the scheme. Even then, Dobbs acquiesced in the proposal only “very 
reluctantly.”93 Knowing how things would later work out, we might wonder 
why he agreed at all. There were, perhaps, hints of romanticism in the deci-
sion: the references to “ancient” predatory habits, or the sporting analogies 
that peppered British raid reports. But the experiment also reveals the limits of 
imperial authority over Iraq’s arid frontiers at this time. That image of British 
aircraft scattering leaflets over the desert below should serve as a reminder 
of the very real difficulties all governments faced in controlling vast, illegible 
environments in the early twentieth century. Many feared that banning raid-
ing would only drive the Bedouin to flee the state’s jurisdiction altogether or 
so undermine the authority of their principal contacts in the desert as to erase 
all pretence of influence or control. The alternative—developing a permanent 
administrative infrastructure—seemed even more daunting. Viewed from 
this perspective, the “Rules for Raiders” scheme becomes a story of Bedouin 
sheikhs and ordinary tribesmen negotiating from a position of strength and 
shaping, in turn, the actions of the state.94
British officials weighed the pros and cons of a resumption of raiding and 
concluded, reluctantly, that the threat to Ibn Hadhdhāl’s authority was more 
than they could afford. The true progenitors of the scheme were the ʿAmārāt 
themselves. For them, it was an attempt to reset the clock back to the war, when 
the British connection had enabled the ʿAmārāt to raid the Shammar with offi-
cial blessing and support. British accounts at the time described these expe-
ditions in terms of “using friendly Arabs to attack [our] enemies.”95 Looking 
back from the distance of a century, it is less clear who was using whom. In 
November 1919, for example, the British asked their “great asset,” Ibn Hadhdhāl, 
to attack the Shammar Jarbah, who had been threatening cultivators in the 
Dulaym division. The outcome was a success but not just for the British: 
93    Ibid.
94    For the limits of the Royal Air Force’s experiment in “air control,” see J.B. Glubb, “Air and 
Ground Forces in Punitive Expeditions.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 71 
(1926): 777-784, and D. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).
95    Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 293. Ibn Hadhdhāl certainly recalled with satisfaction and pride 
the many raids that he and his sons had launched against the Shammar, the Ottomans, 
and their allies: Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl report, cited in Bray, Paladin of Arabia: 318-321.
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when the ʿAmārāt returned, they did so one thousand camels and five hundred 
sheep richer.96
In the eleven months of the “Rules for Raiders” scheme, government policy 
was similarly being moulded by the force of existing Bedouin dynamics. The 
scheme is proof of the extraordinary lengths to which the agency of ordinary 
Bedouin could force sheikhs, and even the state, to go. And if the origins of the 
licensed raiding scheme had deeper roots, so too did the consequences of its 
collapse. For Britain, it dealt a blow to a broader vision of managing the steppe 
through patronage. Ibn Hadhdhāl, meanwhile, was put in the difficult position 
of forbidding the ʿAmārāt from raiding (and returning any loot his tribesmen 
did happen to take) without the means of launching raids in their defence. 
This was “a heavy burden” that sheikhs across the Arab East were increasingly 
being made to carry. “It may be workable in the case of a man with the influ-
ence of Fahad,” one officer reasoned, but for those in a weaker position “the 
system will not work so easily.”97 It was soon put to the test.
3 The ʿAmārāt, their Sheikh, and the Ikhwān Revolt
The collapse of the licensed raiding scheme was bound to cause friction 
between the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh, but two events worked together in the 
late 1920s to make matters even worse.
In 1927, Fahd Ibn Hadhdhāl died, and the colonial sources make clear that 
his son and successor Maḥrūt did not “carry the influence formerly wielded 
by his father.”98 Many blamed this on the weakness of Maḥrūt’s personality. 
Because he had grown up since the arrival of the British and “in the hey-day 
of the Hadhdhāl fortunes,” he had “never been through the fire of tribulation.” 
He was, in short,
born in the purple. Accustomed to spend unlimited money and be treated 
with great respect both by tribesmen and Government officials, he is 
inclined to be vain, extravagant and affected. . . . He has always enjoyed 
a large revenue and strong Government backing. . . . In brief, he is some-
what of a spoilt child.99
96    IOR: L/P&S/11/171, File 2643, Major L.M. Yetts, “Diary of the Dulaim Division for the Month 
of November, 1919.”
97    AIR 23/298, Moore to Aviation Baghdad, 8 June 1925.
98    AIR 10/1348, Handbook.
99    Ibid.
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Such verdicts on Maḥrūt’s character were common, but as an explanation of 
his difficulties as sheikh they leave something to be desired. The importance of 
a stable succession would have been axiomatic, and most sheikhs would have 
prepared for the day by gradually introducing their successor to share in their 
public duties.100 Why, then, was Fahd’s death so disruptive?
Gerald de Gaury, then a British intelligence officer attached to Air 
Headquarters in Iraq, offered a different assessment. “In assessing [Maḥrūt’s] 
character,” he wrote in a 1932 Review of the ‘Anizah Tribe,
it should be remembered that he suffered from an exceptionally strong 
and well-known father who lived to a great age, which consequently, and 
particularly on account of the Oriental custom of keeping the son in the 
background while the father is alive, gave him a difficult start.101
This hints at a more likely explanation of the hurdles Maḥrūt faced. Fahd had, 
in fact, begun preparing for his succession before the First World War, but not 
with Maḥrūt in mind. Maḥrūt’s mother was a Shammari, to whom Fahd had 
been married for a few years, and, after their divorce, the young Maḥrūt was 
raised with her, away from his father and the ʿAmārāt.102 Meanwhile, another 
son, Mitʿab, was being groomed for the succession, leading ʿAmārāt raids dur-
ing the First World War and helping to enforce the blockade. The British con-
sidered Mitʿab “a capable man” and issued him his own monthly stipend.103 But 
in December 1918 he was badly wounded in a raid on the Shammar. His death 
the following month was reported by the British as “a severe loss both to our-
selves and to the Anizeh.”104 It was only later, when Fahd had lost other sons 
to sickness as well as battle, that he “recalled Maḥrūt from the Shammar tents 
to assume his place as his heir.”105 On his arrival, in 1923, John Glubb reported 
how “many of the sheikhs dislike Maḥrūt, the son of Fahad,” branding him “a 
model of conceit and idiocy.”106
100    I am grateful to Yoav Alon for drawing this to my attention. Mithqal al-Fayiz of Trans-
Jordan’s Beni Sakhr, for example, ensured his sons were offered an education, and he 
inducted his son ʿAlif into many of his public duties: Alon, “Silent Voices”: 111.
101    De Gaury, Review of ʿAnizah: 54.
102    Ibid.: 53.
103    IOR, L/P&S/10/620, Tyler, “Diary for Hillah Division”; WO 106/922, General Staff 
(Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force), “Personalities in the Area Occupied by the 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, or Connected Therewith. 1920” (n.d. [1920]).
104    IOR: L/P&S/10/620, Tyler, “Diary for Hillah Division.”
105    De Gaury, Review of ʿAnizah: 54.
106    MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 4, File 9: 13 April 1923.
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Fahd’s death was not the only thing to increase tensions among the 
ʿAmārāt in 1927. Later that year, Ibn Saʿūd’s relationship with the Ikhwān—the 
semi-settled tribes of Wahhabi faith that had been so critical to his earlier 
expansion—dramatically unravelled. With the conquest of the Hijaz complete 
and seeking accommodation with Britain’s presence in the region, Ibn Saʿūd 
had attempted to rein in Ikhwān activism by restricting their raiding, graz-
ing, and trading privileges. The result was the revolt, over the next three years, 
of large sections of the Mutayr, Harb, and Ajman tribes along the frontiers of 
Saudi authority. A series of brutal raids began that November; perhaps as many 
as four hundred Iraqi tribesmen were killed before Ibn Saʿūd re-established 
control.107 Most accounts of the Ikhwān Revolt approach it from a political, 
diplomatic, or military perspective, exploring its impact on the international 
relations of Britain, Najd, and Iraq or its place in narratives of Saudi state 
 building.108 But the crisis generated a wealth of correspondence that also sheds 
light on the histories of the Bedouin groups who were drawn into its orbit.
The Revolt had an immediate impact on the ʿAnaza living in the southern 
and western deserts of Iraq. From Baghdad, Henry Dobbs reported that “unless 
effective measures were taken to prevent further raids” and “restore the confi-
dence” of the ʿAnaza, there was “a serious danger that they would desert Iraq 
and join the Akhwan.”109 Grazing conditions made matters even worse. Most 
of the rain had fallen close to the border the previous winter so that, by March 
1928, practically all the nomad “Iraq tribes” were
bunched together close along the Najd frontier where grazing is com-
paratively plentiful, even the Anaizah having deserted their usual haunts 
and gone far to the south. Thus they offer to the Najd raiders a bait and 
target of quite unusual proportions.110
This exerted tremendous pressure on the government and on Maḥrūt Ibn 
Hadhdhāl to organise some form of active defence and to permit counter-
raiding. One Bedouin group was reported to have put on Ikhwān dress in the 
presence of a British officer and to have denounced the government, saying 
107    A.B. Toth, “Conflict and a Pastoral Economy: The Costs of Akhwan Attacks on Tribes in 
Iraq, 1922-1929.” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 11 (2002): 201-227.
108    The politics of the conflict are discussed in Kostiner, Making of Saudi Arabia. For its mili-
tary dimensions, see J. Glubb, War in the Desert: An R.A.F. Frontier Campaign (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1960).
109    FO 371/12992-4, Monteagle to Clayton, Draft Instructions for Mission, March 1928.
110    AIR 23/36, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Colonial Office, telegram, 1 March 1928.
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that, if neither the British nor Iraqi governments could help them, they would 
be forced to join the Ikhwān.111
These voices only became louder when, instead of letting tribes counter-
raid, the government ordered them back from the frontier, despite the inevi-
table herd losses that would be caused by abandoning their grazing grounds.112 
Once again, it was the Dahamsha who became the most visible symbol of 
resentment and unrest. From Dīwāniyya, John Glubb, the administrative 
inspector, reported “serious danger of the Anaizah seceding unless they see 
vigorous preparations [for defence].” The Dahamsha of Jazza Ibn Mijlad were 
openly talking of abandoning Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl for Najd; half the Ẓafīr 
had already gone over to Ibn Saʿūd.113 When the High Commissioner met with 
Maḥrūt Ibn Hadhdhāl in March, it was all he could do to dissuade him from 
commencing counter-raiding on his own terms.114
Sensing the stakes, the British did establish a temporary police post to pro-
tect the Dahamsha grazing grounds. In an inversion of an earlier turn of phrase, 
it was now their “stabilization,” by Britain, that had become important for “the 
control of the Anaizah.”115 Nonetheless, the official response of the British was 
still temporary and military in its assumptions. The British Residency and the 
Air Officer Commanding announced the creation of a cordon sanitaire, a line of 
defence patrolled by aircraft and armoured cars, behind which all tribes were 
ordered to retreat. Any Bedouin discovered between that line and the frontier 
would be considered hostile and liable to attack, creating a considerable buffer 
between the Euphrates and the frontier but cutting off access to grazing. It also 
explicitly denied a role in defence for the Bedouin themselves.116 Despite the 
deteriorating situation, the British remained set against the idea: the shadow 
of the failure of the licensed raiding experiment, the speed with which it had 
unravelled, and the unpredictability of its consequences for Britain’s relation-
ship with Ibn Saʿūd hung over this decision.
Fayṣal had no such reservations. In fact, his very enthusiasm for a resump-
tion of Bedouin raiding only hardened British opposition to the idea. For the 
111    AIR 23/33, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Secretary of State for Colonies, 29 December 
1927.
112    AIR 23/36, High Commissioner, Baghdad to Colonial Office, telegram, 1 March 1928.
113    AIR 23/36, Glubb to Cornwallis, 23 February 1928; AIR 23/36, High Commissioner, Baghdad 
to Colonial Office, telegram, 1 March 1928.
114    AIR 23/37, H. Dobbs (High Commissioner, Baghdad), untitled note, 10 March 1928.
115    FO 371/ 12992-4, Dobbs to Amery, telegram, 25 May 1928, 31 May 1928; FO 371/ 12992-4, 
Dobbs to Amery, 31 May 1928.
116    AIR 23/34, R. Jope-Slade, “Situation Report—Southern Desert,” 27 January 1928.
190 fletcher
jesho 58 (2015) 163-199
king, the Ikhwān Revolt against Ibn Saʿūd’s authority presented an opportu-
nity to step up the conflict with his old dynastic rival. It was an open secret in 
British circles in Baghdad that Fayṣal was encouraging Bedouin groups along 
the frontier to assist the Ikhwān; by the latter stages of the revolt, many sus-
pected that a full-fledged conspiracy with Najdi Shammar had been hatched.117 
Lobbying for the use of tribal forces was also “part of [a] campaign for obtain-
ing more powers” by the king: a way to strengthen his hand in (and circumvent 
British supervision of) military affairs.118 Fayṣal made it clear that his own con-
tacts among the Shammar, Dahamsha, and Ẓafīr would form the basis of any 
tribal force. He remained deeply wary of the Hadhdhāl clan, given their long 
association with British influence in the desert, and expressly excluded them 
from his preparations. In 1927, he had been responsible for cutting Fahd’s sub-
sidy and actively promoting the feud with the Dahamsha in order to further 
erode his authority.119 Now, Fayṣal dismissed Fahd’s son as a man “absorbed 
in his personal interests” while reaching out to others in the ʿAmārāt, espe-
cially Maḥrūt’s rivals among the Dahamsha, to join his Bedouin force.120 While 
the High Commissioner was pouring cold water on Maḥrūt’s request to take 
up arms, the king invited several Shammar sheikhs and Ibn Mijlad of the 
Dahamsha to serve as commanders of any future camel corps.121
In addition to Fayṣal’s attempts to undermine Maḥrūt and the discontent 
among the ʿAmārāt at being unable to raid, financial troubles placed further 
strain on the relationship between the ʿAmārāt and their sheikh. Prohibition 
of khuwwa and frustrated access to grazing affected the prospects of all the 
nomads of the Shāmiyya, but Ibn Hadhdhāl’s privileged position in regulating 
desert trade meant he perhaps had further to fall. Soon after the revolt began, 
the British contacted Maḥrūt to resurrect the blockade arrangements that had 
both demonstrated and enhanced his father’s economic power during the First 
World War. It only then became apparent that Maḥrūt’s pass system no lon-
ger carried the same force. When the administrative inspector spoke with the 
sheikh about the blockade, he was surprised to see how “Maḥrūt jumped at 
the idea” as a way “to recover his old pass system”: officials in Baghdad had 
assumed that it had never declined. It seemed that the permits Maḥrūt issued 
to conduct musābala “ha[d] actually been a dead letter in the last few years, 
117    AIR 23/56, Young to Passfield, 21 October 1929.
118    FO 371/12995, Gladwyn Jebb (Foreign Office) minute, 24 October 1928.
119    AIR 23/38, K. Buss, untitled minute, 31 March 1928; AIR 23/295, R.M. Doster to Aviation 
Baghdad, 17 July 1927.
120    FO 371/12995, E 4661/1/91, “Memorandum by King Faisal”, Aug 1928.
121    AIR 23/38, Lt Col. J. I Eadie (for Inspector General, Iraqi Army) to Dobbs, 29 March 1928.
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because Anaizah caravans without passes from Ibn Hadhdhāl are allowed 
by Government officials to buy [supplies] in [the] towns.”122 Further reports 
revealed that the iltizām (tax farm) Maḥrūt held for the taxation of the ʿAnaza 
was equally unpopular and that evasion was widespread.123
The arrangements devised for the new desert blockade reflected this state 
of affairs. When the new system went into effect in January 1929, the British 
and Iraqi authorities permitted many more sheikhs to issue passes than they 
had during the war. Seven Dahamsha sheikhs, four from the Ẓafīr, and eight 
from the Shammar were all given this responsibility; Maḥrūt’s jurisdiction 
covered only those wishing to supply in the Dulaym liwa.124 The British even 
saw this levelling of the pass system as a chance to improve relations with the 
Dahamsha, “who have always resented the power” the system had given to 
the Hadhdhāl clan.125 It was, moreover, a position the British were disinclined 
to reinstate. The Hadhdhāl pass system had been an asset in the past, Glubb 
wrote to Cornwallis, but “I doubt if it is advisable to go back.”126 It would only 
be supported until “the new regime of permanent official control of desert 
affairs has had time to establish itself.”127
The decline of the pass system during the 1920s contributed to a general ero-
sion of Maḥrūt’s economic influence. His monopoly of the bāj, the per capita 
tax on ʿAnaza camels, was so easily evaded that, in 1928, officials proposed abol-
ishing it and conducting their own count.128 Two years later, ʿAnaza caravans 
were again reported to have found a way around the sheikh’s taxes, by avoiding 
the towns and purchasing their supplies directly from farmers instead.129 In a 
letter of 1930, John Glubb recounted an interview with the tearful sheikh, in 
which Maḥrūt set out the causes and consequences of his reduced position. He 
was badly indebted to his agent in Karbala, he said, and could no longer afford 
to dispense the largesse required to maintain his influence with his followers. 
His subsidy had been slashed by the Ministry of Finance—a move driven by 
“political hostility, not genuine economy”—while the revenue from his estates 
122    AIR 23/38, Glubb to Cornwallis, 30 March 1928.
123    AIR 23/44, J.B. Glubb, “Monthly Administration Report, Southern Desert area, for the 
Month of September 1928,” October 1928.
124    AIR 23/43, Minister of Interior, draft “Prohibition of Musabilah,” October 1928.
125    AIR 23/38, Cornwallis to Dobbs, 3 April 1928.
126    AIR 23/38, Glubb to Cornwallis, 30 March 1928.
127    AIR 23/39, Buss to Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, 16 April 1928.
128    AIR 23/44, Glubb, “Monthly Administration Report, Southern Desert area, for the Month 
of September 1928.”
129    AIR 23/60, Gerald De Gaury (SSO Baghdad) to Air Staff Intelligence, “Desert Tribal News,” 
8 September 1930.
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did not make up the shortfall (“he is not very clever at business,” Glubb added).130 
Glubb saw two ways out of the dilemma: to shore up Maḥrūt’s position with 
an increased subsidy or a loan or to cut him loose and “take over the whole 
business [of tribal control] with government forces.” Neither was without cost 
or risk, and neither, in fact, was fully carried out. But the events of the Ikhwān 
Revolt seem to have marked a turning point in Britain’s approach to admin-
istering the desert. Hadhdhāl authority was not what it had once been, and, 
from now on, the government would be increasingly prepared to deal with the 
tribes itself.
Did this amount to a loss of Bedouin autonomy? Maḥrūt may well have 
thought so—in a few short years, he had become increasingly marginalised 
from the dialogue between the ʿAmārāt and the colonial state—but it is not 
clear that more ordinary tribesmen saw things in those terms. After all, it was 
their threats of wholesale defection to Najd, combined with the need to head 
off Fayṣal’s bids for their allegiance, that had drawn the British deeper into 
desert affairs. Throughout the second half of the 1920s, there is good evidence 
of ʿAmārāt tribesmen appealing to government, rather than to the sheikh, to 
defend their central interests.131 Even those Dahamsha who had already fled 
to Najd spoke of their readiness to return, but only if Maḥrūt “ceased to be the 
channel through which Government orders are delivered” and if the govern-
ment dealt with them directly.132 By 1928, Maḥrūt’s subsidy, which had once 
been so conspicuous, had become merely one of many being paid to “innumer-
able leaders” throughout the Shāmiyya.133
From this perspective, the growth of direct administration in the steppe 
need not be seen as antithetical to all forms of Bedouin autonomy. We tend 
to look at the processes of partition and colonial rule in terms of governments 
“encapsulating” nomads, binding their future to that of the nation state. From 
the perspective of many ordinary Bedouin, however, it was they who had 
negotiated the government into providing valuable services and resources in 
the face of the Ikhwān threat. Throughout official discussions of how best to 
respond to the revolt, there is a sense of government being drawn into the des-
ert as much as stamping its loyalties on the Bedouin. Officials found themselves 
130    MEC, John Glubb papers, Box 5, File 4: J.B, Glubb to K. Cornwallis, 11 March 1930.
131    See, e.g., AIR 23/30, H. Hindle James (SSO Diwaniyah) to Aviation Baghdad, 12 May 1927; 
AIR 23/46, J.B. Glubb, “Monthly Administration Report for the Southern Desert area, for 
the Month of December, 1928,” 14 January 1929.
132    AIR 10/1348, Handbook: 138-9; AIR 23/41, Glubb to Cornwallis, Administrative Inspector 
report for June 1928.
133    fo 371/12995, E 5232/1/91, Gladwyn Jebb (Foreign Office) minute, 8 November 1928.
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taking up obligations established by active sheikhs in the recent past and being 
judged by the expectations of ordinary tribesmen. In Bedouin eyes, govern-
ment itself became an alternate means of securing generosity, protection, posi-
tions, and access to grazing and markets. As William Lancaster explained more 
than thirty years ago, these were precisely the things that mattered most to 
ordinary tribesmen.134 The focus on the more elite Bedouin interests of inde-
pendence and political activism, in contrast, may have led us to stress discon-
tinuity unduly. The sheikh of the ʿAmārāt—paramount sheikh of the ʿAnaza, 
no less—may have cared a great deal about asserting his autonomy of gov-
ernment. For others, it may have been other forms of autonomy—a freedom 
from want, perhaps, or a freedom from fear—that were always foremost in 
their minds.
 Conclusion
The three episodes presented here provide a glimpse into the history of a 
Bedouin group that has seldom been the focus of enquiry. They also suggest 
the myriad ways in which the Bedouin, their sheikhs, and multiple branches 
of the state became entangled in a newly partitioned Middle East. Although 
these episodes were unique, the experience of partition and colonial rule was 
something shared by Bedouin across the interwar Middle East, and several 
wider themes emerge.
The first is that the specific characteristics of colonial rule mattered: we 
should hesitate to equate it with “state building” or “modernity” writ large. For 
much of the 1920s, the British presence on Iraq’s frontiers was more cautious 
and its objectives more limited. Even the crisis of 1927-28 only coaxed officials 
in Baghdad reluctantly into a deeper engagement with the steppe. Until then, 
attempts to manage its affairs through patronage afforded considerable lati-
tude to accomplished Bedouin leaders. Moreover, it is hard to speak of a single, 
monolithic “state” with reference to the mandates: in French Syria and British 
Trans-Jordan, too, authority was more often contested between a number of 
distinct interests and organisations, be they local, imperial, national, or dynas-
tic. Opportunities persisted for many Bedouin groups, and forms of autonomy 
could be sustained, because of this pluralism at the heart of the mandatory 
regime. In Iraq’s Southern Desert, this manifested itself recurrently in the com-
peting attempts of both British officialdom and the Hashemite court to enlist 
Bedouin assistance.
134    Lancaster, Rwala Bedouin Today: 120.
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A second theme concerns the economic foundations of Bedouin power. 
Colonial sources seldom discussed it in these terms, but the idea runs through-
out our three episodes, whether in terms of the influence conferred on a sheikh 
by his control of blockades or pass systems, or in terms of the real pressures 
applied by more ordinary tribesmen demanding access to pasture, markets, 
and other resources. For Bedouin leaders, wealth funded the generosity and 
hospitality so central to their wider influence and standing: in this, and in Fahd 
and Maḥrūt, we have a tale of two sheikhs. The wider context of partition is 
also relevant here, although its impact could cut two ways. New international 
boundaries could weaken Bedouin economies by frustrating access to grazing 
and shrinking herds. But for some, at least, partition also provided new oppor-
tunities. For much of the period, the ʿAmārāt were able to turn their supposed 
liminality—their position at the geographic limits of multiple states—to real 
advantage. Ibn Hadhdhāl’s success in the immediate post-war year lay in real-
ising that partition had resulted in a constellation of weaker governments 
between which he might act as a valued intermediary. Likewise, this multi-
polar Middle East provided an outlet for more ordinary tribesmen too, who 
demonstrated time and again their readiness to move across borders in search 
of patronage, protection, and gifts.
Finally, our three episodes reveal nomads acting as political catalysts as 
much as political actors, actively shaping their environment and not simply 
adapting to it. This should be a reminder, even for scholars working on the 
modern period, that it remains difficult to deal in the fixed, oppositional cat-
egories of “tribe” and “state,” or even, from the ʿAmārāt’s point of view, to dis-
cern “intrinsic” from “extrinsic” dynamics.135 As the ʿAmārāt, their sheikhs, and 
multiple representatives of the state all jostled for influence, the southern and 
western deserts of Iraq became a vast space of negotiations, creating distinct 
political formations and arrangements that might not otherwise have existed. 
Both the ongoing ʿAnaza-Shammar rivalry and established Bedouin concerns 
about accessing markets, for example, permeated the workings of Britain’s 
wartime blockade. A few years later, Bedouin pressures to restore the economy 
of raiding combined with renewed intertribal tensions to push the govern-
ment into an unparalleled experiment in licensing raids. The Ikhwān Revolt 
certainly weakened the hand of some sheikhs and saw the government take on 
some of their roles, but officials did so, at least in part, to meet the  expectations 
135    For the range of thinking about this problem, compare Tribes and State Formation in the 
Middle East, ed. P.S. Khoury and J. Kostiner (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), and Crone, “Tribes 
and States.”
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of less prominent Bedouin, whose entreaties drew new authorities into the 
Syrian Desert to sustain established functions.
Beyond the back-and-forth of the internal/external debate, the ʿAmārāt’s 
experiences ultimately suggest a notion of co-production to be more appropri-
ate. During the First World War, as British intelligence officers struggled to sift 
the rumours and reports emanating from the Syrian Desert, they crudely clas-
sified all Bedouin raids as “pro-Turk” or “anti-Turk.” But the more astute among 
them accepted that, “while [these] operations will doubtless react upon our-
selves and our enemies, they are primarily directed against one or more of the 
other Arab leaders.”136 Bedouin politics, in short, was charged by the war and 
the war by Bedouin politics, neither being subsumed by the other. In the years 
that followed, governments may have come to assume greater responsibility 
for the desert, but their actions still owed much to previous patterns of activity 
and obligation.
Thinking about these problems within a framework of the mandates can 
help us to compare and connect disaggregated national histories,137 but it is 
also an invitation to examine more critically the specific political configura-
tions that mandatory rule entailed. As the case of the ʿAmārāt makes clear, 
the expansion of government power and the erosion of Bedouin autonomy 
was by no means a linear process. It may be some time before we have a more 
complete history of the Syrian Desert from below, if the sources will ever per-
mit it. But for a topic as vulnerable to false dichotomies such as the relations 
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